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ABSTRACT 
 
A paradox exists within the context of the German federal system.  On one side stands a strong 
view that pervades society and academia that the German system strives for and produces 
uniform policy outcomes across the heterogeneous Lӓnder, which is at odds with what one is 
conditioned to expect from a federal state.  On the other side sits research and findings, though 
less common, that Germany does and has historically had diverse policy outcomes. This article 
starts to unwind the puzzle on how two views that appear to be diametrically opposed to one 
another co-exist in Germany. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There are sixteen German Länder, and they have significant autonomous legislative and 
executive powers across a wide range of public policy fields. A visiting Martian might expect that 
a federal system with sixteen separately constituted political units would produce significant 
territorial diversity in public policy outcomes. Yet if the Martian were to read the great bulk of 
academic writing on German federalism it would be led to believe that the Länder are, in fact, 
restricted in the use of their policy-making powers by two things: an integrated multi-level policy 
process in which the federal and Länder governments cooperate with one another to ensure 
citizens have ‘uniform living conditions’ (as the German constitution puts it1); and strong 
normative expectations in public opinion that ‘living conditions’ should, indeed, be uniform.  
 So the Martian might well imagine that there is, in consequence, little variation in the 
public policy outcomes experienced by citizens across different Länder. However, the reality is a 
little more complicated. There is a dominant tradition of research on German federalism which 
focuses on the undoubted and manifold institutional interlinkages which connect the Länder 
with one another and to the Federal Government in making and applying public policy. Fritz 
Scharpf’s term Politikverflechtung2 – policy ‘entanglement’ – has enduringly captured these dense 
networks. But the dominance of this tradition has diverted attention from other work which 
reveals a different ‘face’3 of German federalism, one which recognises the diversity that logic 
suggests surely must exist in a political system made up of sixteen discrete units. 
 The other face of German federalism was revealed in the same era as Scharpf’s own 
pioneering work, most prominently in the work of Manfred Schmidt. One of the enduring 
themes in Schmidt’s work, which had a powerful influence on comparative political analysis in 
western Europe, has been the question of whether political parties ‘matter’, that is whether 
governments formed by parties of the left or the right actually do different things when in 
power.4 The foundation for that comparative work across states was laid in his 1980 book on 
German federalism ‘The CDU and the SPD in Government: A Comparison of Their Policies in 
the Länder’. In that book – as in his international comparisons – he found that what 
governments did was influenced both by things largely beyond their direct control (like 
economic climate and demography) but also by their own partisan preferences. So among the 
Länder in Germany, just as among states internationally, the policy outcomes experienced by 
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citizens varied because of the political choices made by those governments – which of course 
reflect the different electoral choices made by citizens – as well as the fiscal constraints faced by 
governments.  
 Since this time, there have been periodic echoes of Schmidt’s early work on German 
federalism, with a particular acceleration in the last decade,5 not least as the debate about the 
reform of – and decentralisation of competences in – German federalism intensified. That in 
turn motivated us to revisit Schmidt’s work in a more systematic way, revealing a picture of 
perhaps unexpectedly high degree of policy variation across the Länder, as we have discussed in 
detail elsewhere6 and report in summary in the next section. This high degree of policy variation 
challenges the ‘myth’ of uniform living conditions in Germany signalled in the title of this article.  
 The ‘paradox’ of uniform living conditions also referred to in the title has to do with the 
second of the factors widely held to limit the scope for policy variation in the Länder: the strong 
normative expectations of uniformity thought to be held by the general public in Germany. If, of 
course, there is in fact a high degree of policy variation, then any such expectations are not being 
fulfilled. Such a mismatch between expectations and what actually happens could be 
problematic. Yet it is difficult to know if this is the case or not because surprisingly little work 
has ever been done in exploring public expectations and assessments of the federal system in 
Germany, and some of what has been done has been of poor quality. So the third section of this 
article reviews what we know about what citizens think and expect of federalism in Germany. It 
finds a ‘federalism paradox’ in which citizens appear to simultaneously want both more powerful 
Länder and uniformity of policy outcomes. The final section draws together insights from these 
analyses of policy variation and of public attitudes to reflect further on the different ‘faces’ the 
German federal system appears to present.  
 
 
POLICY VARIATION 
 
Policy variation can be measured in a number of ways. We focus here on how public spending 
by Land governments is allocated across a range of standard categories, along with data on policy 
outcomes.7 We benefit in this from the extraordinary scrupulousness of the German Federal 
Statistical Office which collates enormous amounts of data, disaggregated by Land, generally in 
highly accessible ways. To examine spending decisions we used the Statistical Office’s annual 
Finances and Taxes reports,8 condensing seventy expenditure categories into a simplified set of 
eight policy domains, echoing as far as possible the Classification of the Functions of 
Government (COFOG) coding scheme used by the defined by the United Nations Statistics 
Division9 and used by the OECD to compare spending across states. We then establish the 
proportion of the total Land budgets spent in these eight domains.10 Table 1 sets out spending 
patterns for the period 1995-2010, with in total 256 cases for each category (16 years, 16 Länder). 
The first column sets out the mean proportion of Land budgets allocated to the different 
spending categories. The others show the extent of variation around that mean, which is 
significant. The minimum and maximum proportions vary widely. 
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Table 1: Public Spending in the Länder by Category, 1995-2010 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Government Operations 9.18 2.20 5.67 19.06 
Education and Research 23.86 6.44 13.95 41.31 
Social Protection 24.64 10.15 6.15 47.02 
Economic Development 10.06 5.68 2.19 24.94 
Public Order and Safety 15.18 3.33 8.33 23.02 
Transportation 11.73 3.43 3.40 18.34 
Community Development   2.99 1.82 0.71 11.91 
Culture and Recreation   2.36 0.93 0.71   5.21 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations. 
 
 Figure 1 then takes one of these areas – public order and safety, reflecting Land 
responsibilities in policing and criminal justice – and sets out the proportion of spending on that 
area by Land over the fifteen year period. It shows both year-to-year variations by Land, with 
spending in the category remaining largely flat in some and rising or falling on others, and 
differences between Länder, with some consistently committing a higher proportion of spending 
to public order, others a consistently lower proportion, and others walking a middle ground. 
Similar patterns can be observed in the other seven spending domains. Based on Figure 1, we 
can begin to see that different Länder prioritise different things.  
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Figure 1: Variation by Land in Spending on Public Order and Safety 1995-2010 
 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations. 
 
 Spending data do not of course tell the whole story. Spending decisions do not 
necessarily translate into differences in policy outcomes. And spending decisions do not cover 
the full range of government activity, including regulatory activity. So it is also important to look 
at outcomes. Figure Two gives an illustration in the field of public order and safety, setting out 
variation in prison occupancy rates by Land, measured as the number of prisoners relative to 
prison capacity. Of course, prison occupancy rates are influenced by longer term factors 
including the building of prisons and patterns of sentencing. However Figure 2 reveals 
substantial short-term variation in occupancy that would appear not just to reflect longer term 
infrastructure decisions or sentencing cultures. The first graph shows the extent of variation by 
Land in each year of the twelve year period 1999-2010; the second looks at variation over the 
twelve year period in each Land. Variation is substantial by both measures, ranging from a lowest 
occupancy rate across the period of 46.30 per cent in Bremen in 2000 and a highest of 119 per 
cent in Thuringia in 2005.  
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Figure 2: Variation in Prison Occupancy Rates 1999-2010 
  
  
 
 Figure Three furthermore suggests a clear relationship between the different priorities 
Land governments commit to spending on public order and safety, and the policy outcome 
indicators for public order and safety.  Below government spending priorities are measured using 
a spatial proximity model where lower values for spending priorities are associated with greater 
spending on policy areas referred to as collective goods, including public order and safety.11  In 
Figures 3a (Clearance Rates) and 3b (Prison Occupancy Rates) we see that greater spending on 
collective goods (associated with lower values for government spending priorities) are associated 
with higher rates of case clearances for reported crimes and higher prison occupancy (where 
clearing more cases would connect to more incarcerations).  This relationship of spending and 
outcomes suggests that policy outcome variation is not only linked to differences in context but 
also to the consequences of differences in decision making from Land to Land. 
 
Figure 3: Spending Decisions relative to Clearance Rates and Prison Occupancy  
 
                 
 
This is of course just one policy outcome indicator in one policy field. But our analysis of other 
indicators in other fields, reported elsewhere,12 shows a similar pattern and does so both in 
policy fields where the Länder have exclusive responsibility and in others where they are 
responsible for putting federal law into effect. There is substantial variation across the board. 
Policy uniformity in German federalism is indeed a myth.  
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 Some of that variation inevitably has to do with factors outside the direct control of 
governments. Our analysis showed, for example, that differences in economic conditions in the 
Länder impact significantly on policy outcomes, as do (less strongly) differences in the 
institutional structures of government across the Länder. But we also found that politics – which 
we operationalised in a measure of the strength of left-leaning parties – also impacts on the 
extent of policy variation by Land.13 In other words, and alongside structural constraints beyond 
the short term control of the Länder governments, voters’ preferences for different political 
parties in different Länder, and the impact of those different preferences on policy, also helps to 
drive policy variation across the Länder. Citizens’ political choices are one of the factors in 
producing a ‘non-uniformity’ of living conditions. 
 
The Federalism Paradox 
 
That conclusion resonates with findings from recent work14 on voting behaviour in the Länder. 
This has challenged older understandings15 that Länder elections simply reflect national politics 
by identifying conditions and extents to which voters consider Land-level factors when making 
their electoral choices. But such a conclusion appears inconsistent with the widespread 
understanding that citizens in Germany are enthusiastic advocates of uniformity of living 
conditions. One the boldest statements to this effect is that of Fritz Scharpf in 2008:  
 
The post-war German polity is a federal state with a unitary political culture … there are 
no politically salient territorial cleavages … and no popular demands for regional 
autonomy. Mass communication is dominated by nationwide media; political issues are 
defined and debated nationally; and public attention is focused on national parties even 
where they compete for office in the Länder. By contrast, the political salience of policy-
making at the regional level is quite low, and the 16 Land elections have the character of 
‘second-order national elections’ as parties tend to fight over national policy choices and 
about the performance of the national government.16 
 
 Such views, however forthrightly put, are often curiously lacking in detailed evidence. 
Very little survey research has been done which focuses on (and still less which also tries to 
explain) public attitudes to the institutions and roles of the Länder as compared to other levels of 
government. There are three main exceptions. First, the IfD-Allensbach survey company has 
carried out infrequent surveys on federalism.17 One IfD survey from 1995, which was carried out 
for the Bundesrat (Germany’s second chamber, representing the Länder Governments) appears 
to be the most comprehensive.18 Second, a rather flawed survey with an idiosyncratic 
questionnaire was commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation, and conducted by the Infas 
research institute, in 2007.19 And third, three German Länder – Bavaria, Lower Saxony and 
Thuringia – were surveyed by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen as part of a 14-region comparative 
survey project, Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS), in 2009 and led by one of the current 
authors.20 Though only a snapshot in three out of sixteen Länder, the surveys of the three CANS 
Länder were of sufficient sample sizes to enable a more robust analysis of public attitudes on 
diversity vs uniformity, and are the main focus here.  
 However, a number of the CANS themes were prefigured in the earlier surveys noted 
above, suggesting a number of enduring features in public attitudes on federalism. The 1995 IfD-
Allensbach survey was based on a representative sample of 2167 Germans carried out in 
September 1995 and in many cases disaggregated its findings between western and eastern 
Länder, reflecting the recent process of German unification. It did not disaggregate findings for 
individual Länder. It explored citizens’ trust in, and evaluated their sense of the importance of, 
Länder as compared to federal government, and looked in detail at attitudes to policy variation 
and fiscal equalisation.  
7 
 
 The IfD survey reported directly on the question of policy variation – whether it existed, 
and what people thought of it – though asked it in a rather convoluted way.21 Nonetheless the 
finding is interesting. Over half of both east and west Germans thought there were ‘big 
differences’ in policies across the Länder, and 85 per cent of that group in the east and 67 per 
cent in the west found that to be ‘not good’. Of those (21 per cent in the east, 28 per cent in the 
west) who thought there were ‘hardly differences at all’ less than five per cent in either part of 
Germany felt that ‘bigger differences’ would be ‘better’. Unsurprisingly, then, when asked 
whether particular policy fields should be ‘regulated in a uniform way across the federation as a 
whole’ or ‘a matter for the Länder’, in all fields the preference was for federation-wide regulation, 
and generally by a wide margin (Table 2). So a uniformity of living conditions was certainly a 
public preference in 1995. 
 
Table 2: Federal Regulation or a Matter for the Länder? 
1995 data Federal 
Regulation 
% 
Matter for 
the Länder 
% 
Financing and organisation of the police 52 42 
Local election franchise for foreigners 53 32 
Rail transport 59 29 
School leaving qualifications 69 26 
Motorway speed limits 73 19 
Decisions on the deportation of foreigners convicted of crimes 75 19 
Higher education policy 71 18 
Setting ozone pollution limits 76 17 
Approvals for nuclear power stations 76 14 
Policy on narcotics 78 14 
Setting drink-drive limits 85 7 
Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 6019, September 1995, p. 26. 
 
 That endorsement of uniformity was, however, qualified in other ways, in part by 
seemingly contradictory findings. Most prominently citizens appeared to invest a significantly 
higher degree of trust in Länder as compared to federal governments and to favour closer 
proximity of decision-making. So, asked which of the federal or Länder governments ‘was more 
concerned about the worries and needs of the people’, the Länder were preferred in a ratio of 
five to one: 52 per cent picked the Land government and just ten per cent the federal 
government (25 per cent picked neither and another 13 per cent did not know).22 And asked 
whether ‘seen in the round, the Länder have too much influence over politics in the Federal 
Republic or too little or just about the right level’, the most popular response was ‘too little’ with 
hardly anyone saying they had ‘too much’ influence (Table 3). Respondents in the east were 
significantly more likely to think the Länder had too little influence, no doubt seeing in the 
Länder a potential for powerful advocacy of distinctive eastern interests following German 
unification. 
 
Table 3: Too Much or Too Little Influence for the Länder? 
1995 data Germany 
% 
West 
% 
East 
% 
Too much influence 6 6 3 
About right 34 38 18 
Too little influence 42 38 60 
Don’t know 18 18 19 
Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 6019, September 1995, p. 5. 
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 Other questions in the IfD-Allensbach survey pointed to a more general desire for the 
Länder to play a strong policy role. Asked which level of government should have the ‘primary 
responsibility’ for a range of policy issues (mainly within, but some beyond the constitutional 
competence of the Länder) the Länder came out as first choice for issues which shaped the 
immediate ‘social environment’ (‘Lebensumfeld’) of citizens, including leisure time opportunities, 
bus services, pre-school care and post-school training opportunities.23 Especially interesting was 
a small survey experiment that asked about who should be responsible for particular policy issues 
generically, and then with a prompt to encourage respondents to think of that issue in their own 
immediate context. With the prompt the proportion opting for Länder responsibility rose in part 
sharply, especially on job creation and environmental measures (Table 4).24  
 
Table 4: Federal vs Länder Responsibility 
1995 data Federal Responsibility 
% 
Länder Responsibility 
% 
That more good jobs are created 58 32 
That more good jobs are created in this area 16 77 
That more businesses are established  19 68 
That more businesses are established in our area 12 78 
That more is done to prevent pollution in our rivers 
and countryside, and to ensure healthy foodstuffs 
61 28 
That more is done here to prevent pollution in our 
rivers and countryside, and to ensure healthy 
foodstuffs 
46 45 
Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 6019, September 1995, p. 19. 
 
 These findings suggest that even if uniformity of policy outcomes was the general 
preference, there is a countervailing tendency to see the Länder as better suited, and more 
trustworthy, to deal with some matters. There is an implicit contradiction here. If the Länder 
should be doing more, then policy outcomes would logically vary more. As IfD put it, ‘the 
population wants the Länder to carry out many responsibilities, thinks they will be better carried 
out in the Länder, and at the same time argues for as much uniform regulation as possible.’25 
This might be called the ‘federalism paradox’;26 as in other decentralised states,27 there is a strong 
desire for the Länder to do more, but not to do things differently.  
 Germany’s fiscal equalisation process can be seen as a constraint on such difference. It is 
designed to ensure that each Land has a similar financial capacity to fulfil responsibilities which 
(aside from the local government responsibilities of the city-states) are uniform across all of the 
Länder. That constraint was strongly supported in the IfD survey. When asked whether or not it 
was right that richer Länder transferred funds to poorer Länder as part of the fiscal equalisation 
process, 88 per cent of east Germans and 76 per cent of west Germans deemed equalisation to 
be ‘right’.28 The 2007 Bertelsmann survey adds interesting nuance to this finding a decade or so 
later, and following a number of controversies about the extent and impacts of equalisation. It 
asked whether rich-poor transfers should be maintained and provided data at the level of the 
individual Land, with a sample size of 250-251 in each Land. At that sample size the margins of 
error are quite significant at more than ±six per cent. Nonetheless some interesting inferences 
can be discerned. Table 5 sets out the Bertelsmann attitudes data by Land from 2007 in rank 
order of support for fiscal equalisation, and ranges that alongside that year’s rank order of 
transfers per head by Land into/out of the equalisation process. The two rank orders bear 
striking similarities. This suggests a differentiation of attitudes in relation to the economic 
circumstances of the Land concerned. The most enthusiastic supporters of equalisation were 
from those Länder which benefitted most from equalisation, the least enthusiastic from those 
that paid into the system. The dotted line in Table Five separates those Länder in which citizens 
were above the Germany-wide average in their support for fiscal equalisation, from Schleswig-
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Holstein upwards, from those in which support was below average. Those above the line were all 
recipients of equalisation transfers that year; those below it paid the transfers. It may not surprise 
that the least enthusiastic about equalisation were citizens in those Länder – Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg – which had been at the forefront of political and constitutional challenges to the 
fiscal equalisation system since German unification. There is here, at least in outline, a sense that 
citizens’ commitment to maintaining uniform living conditions may be qualified by a lesser 
inclination among the ‘rich’ to subsidise the ‘poor’. 
 
Table 5: Support for Fiscal Equalisation by Land29  
Land In favour of 
maintaining 
equalisation 
% 
Rank order  
Supporting 
Equalisation 
Equalisation 
transfers per 
head in 2007 
€M 
Rank order 
Equalisation 
Transfers  
Bremen 90 1 +710 2 
Mecklenburg West Pomerania 90 2 +304 3 
Berlin 87 3 +851 1 
Brandenburg 87 4 +266 6 
Saxony 86 5 +275 5 
Saxony-Anhalt 85 6 +258 7 
Thuringia 85 7 +280 4 
Saarland 83 8 +120 11 
Rhineland Palatinate 82 9 +85 8 
Lower Saxony 81 10 +40 9 
Schleswig-Holstein 80 11 +48 10 
Hamburg 73 12 -209 14 
Hesse 73 13 -475 16 
North Rhine Westphalia 72 14 -2 12 
Bavaria 65 15 -185 13 
Baden-Württemberg 58 16 -216 15 
Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bürger und Föderalismus. Eine Umfrage zur Rolle der Bundesländer (Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2008), p. 24.; http://www.haushaltssteuerung.de/bund-laender-finanzausgleich-
2007.html.  
 
 The 1995 IfD survey also identified a further, potentially differentiating factor: identity. 
In another rather oddly worded question it asked whether respondents felt themselves ‘first and 
foremost’ to be German, West [or East] German, or ‘Landsmann’, a curious choice of wording 
but meant to offer an alternative self-identification at Land level. Only one Land stood out: 
Bavaria, with 41 per cent seeing themselves first and foremost as Bavarian, against a west 
German average of 17 per cent and an east German average of 18 per cent.30 Unfortunately, 
though, no attempt was made to explore whether strong Land-level identification also had an 
impact on questions of uniformity or variation in policy outcomes, though this might have been 
a plausible hypothesis.  
 
 
BAVARIA, LOWER SAXONY AND THURINGIA: CITIZENSHIP AFTER THE 
NATION-STATE 
 
Bavaria, alongside Lower Saxony and Thuringia, was one of the three German cases in the 
Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) project. The CANS project fielded simultaneous 
surveys with common questionnaires in 14 regions in Germany, Austria, France, Spain and the 
UK in 2009. The aim was to explore how citizens negotiated multi-level politics in differently 
configured decentralised states and in particular to identify and explain the expectations and 
evaluations citizens had of the regional level of government in those states. The findings of the 
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project were in one sense limited by only carrying out research on a small number of case study 
regions in each state, but in another enriched by the size of the sample surveyed in each region 
(900+31) bringing a high degree of confidence to the findings (with a margin of error close to ± 
three per cent).  
 The CANS project sought to explore whether and how expectations of the regional 
relative to the state level were shaped by the importance citizens attribute to regional institutions, 
by regional economic performance and by strength of regional identity. The CANS case study 
regions in Germany, like those in other states, were selected to offer variation across these 
factors. This case selection was made to inform an international comparative analysis of regional 
public attitudes, not to be representative of the wider group of sixteen German Länder. So we 
should be cautious not to read out more general findings on German federalism from the three 
cases. That said, the three cases do provide rich data which is otherwise unavailable and which 
add texture to the earlier IfD and Bertelesmann surveys. 
 Indeed, the findings of the CANS case studies quite strikingly underline the ‘federalism 
paradox’ noted above. When asked whether a range of policy issues concerning unemployment 
benefit, university tuition fees, care for the elderly and youth crime should be ‘regulated in the 
same way everywhere in Germany’ (‘ Uniform’ in Table 6)), ‘regulated by Bavaria/Lower 
Saxony/Thuringia itself’ (‘Land’) or “Do not know” (DK), respondents in all three Länder were 
clear. Uniform regulation was the overwhelming preference. The lowest support for uniformity 
on any of the issues was that recorded for unemployment benefit in Bavaria at 74.3 per cent, the 
highest 91.8 per cent on elderly care in Thuringia. On no issue did even one quarter of 
respondents favour Land-level regulation. There were differences across the three Länder, with 
close to nine in ten Thuringians in favour of federal regulation, taken as an average across the 
four policy issues, around ten per cent fewer in Bavaria, with Lower Saxony taking up a mid-
point. 
 
Table 6: Policy Uniformity vs Variation by Land 
 Bavaria Lower Saxony Thuringia 
 Uniform Land DK Uniform Land DK Uniform Land DK 
Unemployment  74.3 22.9 2.8 79.0 18.2 2.9 89.2 8.1 2.7 
Tuition fees 75.1 21.7 3.1 82.8 14.1 3.1 84.1 12.0 3.9 
Elderly care 83.7 13.8 2.5 88.9 9.2 1.9 91.8 6.4 1.8 
Youth Crime 82.9 15.1 2.0 87.6 10.5 2.0 90.8 7.3 2.0 
Source: Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) survey 2009. 
 
 Yet at the same time a clear majority of respondents thought that the respective Land 
government currently had most influence on politics in each Land, and indeed ought to have even 
more (Table 7). On neither the ‘has’ nor ‘ought to have’ option did even one fifth of respondents 
identify or prefer the federal government as the most influential (and less than five per cent in 
each case the EU, which was offered here as a third option). So while respondents did not want 
Land-level policy regulation, they did want the respective Land governments to have yet more 
influence than now. 
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Table 7: Which Does, Which Ought to Have Most Influence? 
 Bavaria 
% 
Lower Saxony 
% 
Thuringia 
% 
Has most influence    
  Land Government 70.1 62.3 65.1 
  Federal Government 12.3 16.5 15.6 
  EU   4.8   4.4   3.0 
  Don’t Know 12.9 15.8 16.4 
Ought to have most 
influence 
   
  Land Government 75.4 76.4 75.7 
  Federal Government 14.7 15.6 14.8 
  EU   3.5   2.2   1.7 
  Don’t Know   6.5  5.9   7.8 
Source: Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) survey 2009. 
 
UNRAVELLING THE PARADOX 
 
 So how might we begin to explore this paradox? The 1995 IfD survey gives one prompt 
in its finding that Länder governments were more trusted to think about the ‘worries and needs’ 
of the people than the federal government. The CANS survey replicated that question and found 
that even more than the 52 per cent recorded across Germany in 1995 felt the Land government 
was more concerned with their ‘worries and needs’ (Table 8). Bavarians felt this most strongly at 
close to 70 per cent, Thuringians least, but still at close to 60 per cent, and Lower Saxons again 
in the middle. The federal government scored less than twenty per cent everywhere. So Länder 
governments appeared to be trusted more to engage with citizens’ concerns. 
 
Table 8: Which Cares about the Worries and Needs of the People? 
 Bavaria 
% 
Lower Saxony 
% 
Thuringia 
% 
More the Land Government 68.4 64.9 59.2 
More the Federal Government 15.4 15.2 18.4 
Don’t know 16.2 19.9 22.4 
Source: Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) survey 2009. 
 
 But they might be trusted to do so because of their capacity to bring people’s concerns 
into statewide policy-making rather than necessarily attuning Länder policies to ‘worries and 
needs’ that might vary across the Länder. That would not necessarily point to a paradox, but 
perhaps a recognition of the interlocked functioning of both levels of government in the 
German federal system. Länder may be deemed influential – and to need more influence – 
precisely because they may be seen as effective in bringing ordinary people’s concerns into 
statewide policy processes. So there is a supplementary question: when respondents say their 
Land government ought to have more influence, or cares more about ordinary people’s concerns 
are they doing so while thinking in a Germany-wide frame (and looking for the Land 
government to secure their interests at the federal level), or a Land-specific one (and looking for 
Land specific actions)?  
 The earlier surveys discussed above pointed to two kinds of variables which might shape 
the frame through which citizens view the role of their Land government: distributional 
questions around the fiscal equalisation process; and questions to do with the strength of Land 
identity relative to German identity.  
 The CANS question on fiscal equalisation sought responses to the statement that ‘the 
richer Länder should transfer money to poorer Länder so that there as well everyone has equal 
access to public services’. As Table 9 shows, majorities in all three Länder agreed with that 
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statement, although responses varied significantly with only a bare majority in agreement in 
Bavaria, a significant minority in disagreement and very few don’t knows. Once again – and 
clearly now part of a pattern – Bavarians had the most pro-Land (or perhaps better the least pro-
federal) disposition. Around twice as many Bavarians were against rich-poor transfers as 
respondents in the other two Länder. 
 
Table 9: Rich-Poor Transfers between the Länder 
 Bavaria 
% 
Lower Saxony 
% 
Thuringia 
% 
Strongly Agree 18.2 33.8 33.9 
Agree 35.2 38.6 38.4 
  Total agree 53.4 72.4 72.3 
Disagree 29.3 18.4 17.8 
Strongly Disagree 13.7   5.7   4.8 
  Total disagree 43.0 24.1 22.6 
Don’t know 3.6 3.5   5.1 
Source: Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) survey 2009. 
 
 Turning to identity, Table 10 captures the relative strength of Land identity by asking 
how attached (‘verbunden’) respondents in Bavaria, Lower Saxony and Thuringia felt to their Land. 
The most attached of the three were the Thuringians, with Bavarians close behind and Lower 
Saxons markedly less attached.  
 
Table 10: Attachment to the Land  
How attached to … Bavaria 
% 
Lower Saxony 
% 
Thuringia 
% 
    
  Not at all   2.6   5.2   2.2 
  Not very 11.1 16.1   7.4 
  Fairly 33.5 42.8 34.1 
  Very 52.3 35.0 56.0 
  Don’t Know   0.4   1.0  0.3 
Source: Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) survey 2009. 
 
 The similar strengths of attachment to the Land in Bavaria and Thuringia are worth 
additional exploration. Table 11 cross-tabulates strength of attachment to the Land against the 
‘which ought to have most influence’ question in Table 7 and the rich-poor transfers question in 
Table 9. There is a similar pattern for each Land on which government ought to have most 
influence. Those most strongly attached to Bavaria and Thuringia believed most strongly that 
their Land government ought to have most influence in Land politics, and the federal 
government ought not. Those less attached to their Land in both Bavaria and Thuringia were 
significantly less fulsome in their endorsement of Land government influence.  
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Table 11: Attachment in Bavaria and Thuringia 
How 
Attached 
Which ought to have most influence? Rich Länder should transfer to poor   
 Land Gov 
% 
Federal Gov 
% 
Agree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
n 
 Bav Thu Bav Thu Bav Thu Bav Thu Bav Thu 
Strongly 80.8 77.8 10.5 14.8 48.3 75.4 48.7 19.4 484 532 
Fairly 74.5 75.9 16.5 13.6 55.2 70.6 40.9 24.7 310 324 
Not very 59.2 67.1 26.2 15.7 69.9 61.4 27.2 34.2 103 70 
Not at all 45.8 47.6 29.2 28.6 70.8 52.3 25.0 48.1 24 21 
Total 75.4 75.7 14.7 14.8 53.4 72.3 43.0 22.6 925 950 
Source: Citizenship after the Nation-State (CANS) survey 2009. 
 
 But there was a strikingly different pattern in the fiscal equalisation question. As Table 
Nine shows Bavarians were in general significantly less supportive of rich-poor transfers than 
Thuringians. But strength of attachment to the Land shaped responses in different ways in each 
Land. Stronger attachment to Bavaria boosted disagreement and reduced agreement to rich-poor 
transfers. Stronger attachment to Thuringia reduced disagreement and boosted agreement to 
rich-poor transfers. There is a suggestion here that being strongly attached to each Land was 
associated with a different framing of the issue of fiscal equalisation. ‘Strong’ Thuringians 
favoured a statewide framework for fiscal equalisation transfers (from which Thuringia drew 
significant financial benefit); ‘strong’ Bavarians were least supportive of that framework (into 
which Bavaria paid significant sums). Yet in both Länder those with a strong attachment to the 
Land thought their Land government ought to be more influential than now.  
 A tentative inference, suggested earlier in the different frames that citizens might bring to 
their understandings of federalism, is that Thuringians wanted a strong influence for their Land 
government in statewide decision-making, seeing this as the best means of securing policies like 
fiscal equalisation that benefit their Land. Bavarians by contrast were more divided, with a 
substantial proportion seeing disadvantage accruing from statewide policies like fiscal 
equalisation and looking to the Land government to work more at Land level to secure their 
interests. To put this into the language of comparative federalism research, Thuringians appeared 
to favour shared rule involving cooperation of federal and Länder governments in setting 
statewide policy standards, while Bavarians appeared divided between those favouring shared 
rule and those favouring a more autonomous form of self-rule. 
 
 
THE TWO FACES OF GERMAN FEDERALISM 
 
This is an inference that is difficult to uphold more fully. It is not confirmed in regression 
analysis using the measures available in the CANS survey, but that may in part be because the 
CANS survey questionnaire did not anticipate the issues around shared vs. self-rule and lacked 
suitable indicators. But there are echoes in our wider findings from comparison across the 
fourteen regions surveyed in the CANS project. These findings point to a distinction between 
types of region: a group of ‘both-and’ regions in which citizens are content for their regional 
governments to pursue regional ends through statewide means; and a group of ‘either-or’ regions 
in which citizens are divided between those who look to the state as a whole to secure their 
interests and those who look in a narrower frame to the region. With one exception the 
individual regions clustered into national groups: UK and Spanish regions were ‘either-or’ and 
Austrian, French and German regions were ‘both-and’ – with the partial exception of Bavaria, 
which exhibited characteristics of both categories.32 
 The apparent differences in how Bavarians and Thuringians negotiate the structures of 
the German federalism are intriguing. There is certainly an agenda here for further-reaching 
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research to explore these patterns of public attitudes more deeply. But there are also grounds for 
connecting such research much more directly with what is an under-recognised pattern of 
territorial policy diversity in Germany. As was shown in the first half of this article the long-
established imagery of a political system geared to producing uniform policy outcomes is 
mythical. While Germany may, in constitutional principle, be supposed to have ‘uniform living 
conditions’, it clearly does not in practice. Some of Germany’s policy diversity is exogenous and 
beyond the influence of governments but some is the intentional consequence of political 
choices made by Land governments, in turn enabled by the electoral choices citizens make to 
produce those governments. Indeed, as the discussion here of public attitudes research shows, 
citizens trust their Land governments more than the federal government and want them to do 
more and the federal government less. Yet when asked directly about policy diversity citizens 
appear not to want it but instead to have the policy uniformity of the German federalism myth.  
 So citizens can simultaneously and, it seems, paradoxically be both a driver of diversity 
and support uniformity of public policy outcomes. What this article tentatively suggests is that in 
two ways this apparent paradox may not be a paradox at all. First, citizens may see powerful 
Land governments as a means of achieving collective goals at a statewide scale. They may in that 
sense have a sophisticated understanding of the possibilities and mechanics of Politikverflechtung. 
But second, not all citizens necessarily think in this way, and those who instead favour greater 
Land autonomy and fewer statewide policy solutions may be clustered in particular Länder. 
There is some evidence that Bavaria hosts competing views, with some favouring uniformity and 
others applauding diversity. Here, in the competing strands of Bavarian public opinion, and 
more generally in the actual patterns of territorial policy diversity that exist in Germany is an 
echo of a wider point we have made elsewhere: there are two ‘faces’ of German federalism, ‘the 
one unitarist and focused on the politics of coordination, the other decentralised and focused on 
the politics of territorial difference. These two faces of German federalism stand in tension, but 
not necessarily in contradiction, with one another.’33 Each face is revealed by different strands of 
scholarship, the dominant strand encountered by our visiting Martian and focused on the 
interlocked federal system and a challenger strand that takes the individual Land as the unit of 
analysis. These two strands of scholarship have each existed for decades, illuminating different 
aspects of the same federal system. It is high time they came together to produce a research 
agenda on German federalism capable of capturing both its faces at the same time and 
understanding how the tensions between them are negotiated at different points in time, in 
different Länder, and in different policy fields.  
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